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Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v. Public Prosecutor1
I.      OVERVIEW
The challenge of defining the exact contours for the offence of possessing controlled drugs in 
Singapore has always received great attention from the legal fraternity, perhaps more so in the 
last few years.2 Section 18 of the Misuse of Drugs Act,3 which deals with the presumptions of 
possession and knowledge of controlled drugs, is central to the discourse:
18. —(1)  Any person who is proved to have had in his possession or custody or 
under his control —
(a) anything containing a controlled drug;
*  LL.B. (National University of Singapore), LL.M. (Harvard), Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore 
Management University; LL.B. (Melbourne), LL.M. (Yale), Foreign Associate, Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer US LLP (New York).
1  [2011] 4 Sing. L.R. 1156 [Nagaenthran].
2  See e.g., Michael Hor, “Misuse of Drugs and Aberrations in the Criminal Law” (2001) 13 Sing. Ac. L.J. 
54 [Aberrations in the Criminal Law]; Michael Hor, “Managing Mens Rea in Singapore” [2006] 18 Sing. 
Ac. L.J. 314; Toh Yung Cheong, “Knowing, Not Knowing and Almost Knowing” [2008] 20 Sing. Ac. L.J. 
677 [Knowing, Not Knowing and Almost Knowing]. 
3  Cap. 185, 2008 Rev. Ed. Sing. [MDA]. Sections 18(3) and 18(4) are omitted.
When the Court of Appeal rendered the decision of Tan Kiam Peng in 2008, it was unable to come 
to a conclusive determination of the correct interpretation of s. 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs 
Act, a provision pertaining to the presumption of an accused’s knowledge of the nature of the 
controlled drugs in his possession. This issue was presented to a differently constituted Court of 
Appeal in Nagaenthran, which seemingly ruled in favour of the narrow interpretation of s. 18(2) 
as opposed to the broader interpretation. Nagaenthran, however, did not address the questions 
raised by Tan Kiam Peng vis-à-vis s. 18(2) in a comprehensive fashion. Indeed, there are various 
angles in which light can be shed on the prism that is s. 18(2), and in this paper, three separate 
and distinct heads will be considered, paying particular regard to cases and perspectives that 
could have impacted Nagaenthran, but were not discussed or elaborated therein: (a) whether there 
is a practical difference between the two interpretations; (b) what more can be said about the 
purposive interpretation of s. 18(2) undertaken in Tan Kiam Peng and other interpretive issues that 
may arise for consideration; (c) whether cases from Hong Kong, which has legislation similar to 
s.18 of the MDA, can offer assistance.
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(b) the keys of anything containing a controlled drug;
(c) the keys of any place or premises or any part thereof in which a 
controlled drug is found; or
(d) a document of title relating to a controlled drug or any other document 
intended for the delivery of a controlled drug,
shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have had that drug in his 
possession.
(2)  Any person who is proved or presumed to have had a controlled drug in his 
possession shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have known the 
nature of that drug.
Recent judgments have attempted to advance the jurisprudence regarding s. 18 of the MDA,4 
one of which is the Court of Appeal’s fairly succinct judgment in Nagaenthran. The court, in a 
judgment delivered by Chan C.J., seemed to affirm that the trial judge was correct in adopting the 
narrow interpretation of s. 18(2) of the MDA, viz., where the presumed knowledge is knowledge 
of the precise nature of the controlled drug in question, as opposed to the broad interpretation, 
viz., where the presumed knowledge is knowledge that the drug concerned was a controlled drug 
without more.5 However, the court further stated that there is no practical distinction between 
the narrow and broad interpretations of s. 18(2) insofar as the rebutting of the presumption of 
knowledge is concerned, because the material issue in s. 18(2) is the non-existence of the accused’s 
knowledge of the controlled drug. Therefore, to rebut the presumption of knowledge, the accused 
has to prove on a balance of probabilities that he did not know the nature of the controlled drug 
referred to in the charge.6 
It is apparent that Nagaenthran wanted to provide conclusive clarifications7 of certain dicta 
found in the Court of Appeal’s seminal judgment (delivered by Andrew Phang J.A.) in Tan Kiam 
Peng.8 There, the court surveyed (and tried to reconcile) virtually all the key precedents before it, 
and promulgated – while inviting future cases to shed more light on the dichotomy – the broad 
and narrow interpretations of s. 18(2). While recognising that the general policy underlying the 
4  See e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Tan Kiam Peng, [2007] 1 Sing. L.R. (R.) 522 [Tan Kiam Peng (High 
Court)]; Tan Kiam Peng v. Public Prosecutor, [2008] 1 Sing. L.R. (R.) 1 [Tan Kiam Peng]; Public Prosecutor 
v. Lim Boon Hiong, [2010] 4 Sing. L.R. 696 [Lim Boon Hiong]; Public Prosecutor v. Phuthita Somchit, 
[2011] 3 Sing. L.R. 719 [Phuthita Somchit].
5  Nagaenthran, supra note 1 at paras. 20–23.
6  Ibid. at para. 24.
7  See Thong Ah Fat v. Public Prosecutor, [2011] SGCA 65 at paras. 3–5 [Thong Ah Fat]; Chan Heng 
Kong v. Public Prosecutor, [2012] SGCA 18 at para. 22 [Chan Heng Kong].
8  Tan Kiam Peng was preceded by a fairly detailed judgment as well: see Tan Kiam Peng (High Court), 
supra note 4.
MDA may be undermined as a result, and that cases existed that seemed to support the contrary, 
the court proposed that given the literal words of the provision and the potential harsh punishment 
that follows conviction, the narrow interpretation of s. 18(2) ought to be preferred.9 The broad 
interpretation, although being more consistent with the general policy underlying the MDA and 
finding support in some precedents, ought to be rejected.10 
It is respectfully submitted that given its conclusive tone,11 Nagaenthran should have addressed 
the questions raised by Tan Kiam Peng vis-à-vis s. 18(2) with greater comprehensiveness. Indeed, 
there are various angles in which light can be shed on the prism that is s. 18(2), and this analysis 
will proceed on three separate and distinct heads, paying particular regard to cases and perspectives 
that could have impacted Nagaenthran, but were not discussed or elaborated therein: (a) whether 
there is a practical difference between the two interpretations; (b) what more can be said about the 
purposive interpretation of s. 18(2) undertaken in Tan Kiam Peng and other interpretive issues that 
may arise for consideration; (c) whether cases from Hong Kong, which has legislation similar to 
s.18 of the MDA, can render assistance.
ii.      CoMMentary
A.      Whether there is a Practical Difference
The most apparent question that emerges once Tan Kiam Peng and Nagaenthran are compared is 
whether the narrow or broad interpretation of s. 18(2) of the MDA is correct – assuming, of course, 
that there is a practical difference. Indeed, shortly after Nagaenthran, the Court of Appeal reiterated 
in Thong Ah Fat that there is no practical difference between the two interpretations insofar as the 
rebutting of the presumption of knowledge is concerned.12 This view may be more easily explained 
and understood with a hypothetical scenario of an accused who is charged with trafficking heroin 
but claims he was in possession of another (controlled) drug. To avoid a conviction, the accused 
must establish the non-existence of knowledge of heroin; he is not, however, required to anticipate 
the Prosecution’s case and additionally show that he did not know that what he possessed was 
cocaine, or that it was any other controlled drug. An accused rebutting an allegation of trafficking 
in a particular drug does not need to show in the affirmative that what he possessed is another 
particular drug, since the charge must refer to and identify the drug in question – the nature of 
the drug being a particular (although not an ingredient) of the offence which must be specified. 
9  Tan Kiam Peng, supra note 4 at paras. 83–95.
10  Ibid.
11  Supra, note 7.
12  Thong Ah Fat, supra note 7 at paras. 3–5. See also Chan Heng Kong, supra note 7 at para. 22.
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Indeed, in a charge of trafficking, the mode of trafficking is another particular which must be 
specified. So, consistent with the practice where the charge alleges possession of heroin for the 
purposes of trafficking, if an accused genuinely believed that he was in possession of something 
other than a controlled drug, or a controlled drug other than heroin, he would succeed in avoiding 
conviction. What he must prove is the non-existence of knowledge of heroin and it does not matter 
whether he does this by focusing on showing that there was no knowledge of any controlled 
drug at all, or that there was no knowledge of the particular controlled drug which is specified 
or referred to in the charge. That said, if the broad interpretation applies, the accused is only 
presumed to have knowledge that the drug concerned was a controlled drug, without more. The 
accused will therefore be acquitted of trafficking in heroin if he can raise reasonable doubt as to 
his alleged knowledge that the controlled drug in question was heroin. On the other hand, if the 
narrow interpretation applies, the accused is presumed to have knowledge that the drug concerned 
was a controlled drug, namely heroin. The accused will therefore be acquitted of trafficking in 
heroin only if he can rebut that presumption on a balance of probabilities. This heavier burden can 
be construed as a practical difference.
Notably, in Lim Boon Hiong, the High Court, citing Tan Kiam Peng, held that the narrow 
interpretation should be preferred in interpreting the knowledge requirement for establishing the 
possession element, despite the fact that in Tan Kiam Peng, the broad and narrow interpretations 
were considered primarily in the context of s. 18(2) rather than the offence of trafficking per se.13 
In so doing, the court observed that there was no indication in Tan Kiam Peng, or the MDA, that s. 
18(2) required a different approach to knowledge than that of the knowledge requirement for the 
establishment of the offense of drug trafficking.14 The court further suggested that the difference 
between the narrow and broad interpretations may be minimised because Tan Kiam Peng had 
clarified that actual knowledge under the MDA entails wilful blindness as well:
“[O]nce an accused person has a firm … suspicion that he is in possession of a 
controlled drug, and then deliberately refrains from confirming that suspicion, 
he will not only be held to know, via wilful blindness, that he is in possession 
of a controlled drug (the broad approach) – he will, ineluctably, also be held to 
know, via wilful blindness, that he is in possession of the specific drug in question 
(the narrow approach), since wilful blindness is the legal equivalent of actual 
knowledge ...”15 
13  Lim Boon Hiong, supra note 4 at paras. 60–62.
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid. at para. 66.
In Nagaenthran, the Court of Appeal, in relation to wilful blindness, departed from its previous 
position where it drew a distinction between “actual knowledge in its purest form” (a term 
employed in Tan Kiam Peng) or “actual knowledge simpliciter” (a term employed in Lim Boon 
Hiong) and wilful blindness, a lesser form of knowledge, although both amount, legally, to actual 
knowledge.16 Referring to the use of the terms “actual knowledge in its purest form” and “actual 
knowledge simpliciter”, the court cautioned that there is no need for “unnecessary refinement 
of the mens rea of knowledge” and, further, that wilful blindness would be “merely ‘lawyer-
speak’ for actual knowledge that is inferred from the circumstances of the case”.17 The court’s own 
conceptualisation, in essence, was that there is only actual knowledge, which is directly proved 
(where the “inference of knowledge is irresistible and is the only rational inference available on 
the facts”) or indirectly proved (via the doctrine of wilful blindness).18 This theoretical clarification 
may have little or no practical ramifications, however, as there was no hint from the court that 
more would be required to establish wilful blindness.
In relation to the rebutting of the presumption in s. 18(2), the Court of Appeal in Nagaenthran 
was of the view that an accused has to prove on a “balance of probabilities” that he had no 
knowledge of the nature of the controlled drug referred to in the charge – the nature of the drug 
being “the actual controlled drug”.19 This appears to be consistent with the narrow interpretation as 
set out in Tan Kiam Peng, for if the broad interpretation applies, as earlier mentioned, the accused 
would only have to raise a reasonable doubt as to knowledge of the nature of the drug in question. 
Therefore, without explicitly saying so, the court seemed to endorse the narrow interpretation (as 
did Lim Boon Hiong, notwithstanding its view that the two interpretations yield little practical 
difference).20 However, and perhaps of greater significance, is the fact that Nagaenthran failed to 
address the reasoning behind the views expressed in Tan Kiam Peng on s. 18(2). Specifically, the 
approach adopted in Tan Kiam Peng in interpreting s. 18(2) placed greater emphasis on the literal 
text of the provision, rather than its purpose. Additionally, to use the words of the court in Tan 
Kiam Peng, “it might even be argued that there is no ambiguity in the statutory language and that 
the literal language is … the strongest argument in favour of the [narrow] interpretation”.21 The 
court had stated this, despite earlier stating that “the literal wording of this provision is also (at 
16  See Knowing, Not Knowing and Almost Knowing, supra note 2 at paras. 29–31. See also Yeo, Morgan, 
and Chan, Criminal law in Malaysia and Singapore, 2d ed. (LexisNexis, 2012) at 95–96. 
17  Nagaenthran, supra note 1 at para. 30 [emphasis in original].
18  Ibid. at para. 30 [emphasis in original].
19  Ibid. at para. 24 [emphasis added]. In a case that came after Nagaenthran, viz., Dinesh Pillai a/l K Raja 
Retnam v. Public Prosecutor, [2012] SGCA 24, the Court of Appeal reiterated at para. 18 “that the words 
‘the nature of that drug’ in s 18(2) of the MDA were simply a reference to the actual controlled drug which 
was proved or presumed to be in the possession of the accused at the material time.”
20  See also Public Prosecutor v. Mas Swan bin Adnan [2012] SGCA 29 at paras. 64–79.
21  Tan Kiam Peng, supra note 4 at para. 91.
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least arguably) consistent with [the broad] interpretation”.22 Indeed, as will be argued below, the 
difficulty in interpreting a statutory provision purposively has troubled our courts for a very long 
time; insofar as all statutory provisions must be interpreted purposively first and foremost, and 
insofar as lives – and not mere liberties – are at stake in the context of the MDA, it is of paramount 
importance that the courts achieve a correct purposive interpretation of s. 18(2).
B.      Exploring the Purposive Approach and Other Interpretive Issues
Turning to the purposive interpretation of s. 18(2), it is necessary to begin by considering a High 
Court case decided just prior to Nagaenthran. The case is Phuthita Somchit, and it had – through 
a purposive lens – expressed an opinion on which view is preferred, though it was not cited in 
Nagaenthran and Thong Ah Fat. In this case, it was held that:
“… Considering the [MDA] as a whole, and the parliamentary debates … It 
would not be inaccurate to state that the general policy underlying the Act is 
that of reducing and even eradicating narcotic drug abuse in Singapore ... the 
[broad] interpretation would make it much easier for the Prosecution to secure 
a conviction... But it is quite a different thing to say that making it easier for the 
Prosecution to secure a conviction would promote the general policy of the Act 
… Our system of criminal justice requires the Prosecution to prove an accused 
person’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt ... The presumption in s 18(2) of the Act 
shifts the burden of proof of knowledge to the accused person once the conditions 
therein are met. The legislature had decided where the line should be drawn in 
relation to that burden. If … the ordinary meaning of the words in s 18(2) point 
to the [narrow] interpretation … there cannot be room for any consideration as to 
whether this meaning “undermines the general policy” of the Act as Parliament 
had decided on this line as the appropriate balance between burden on the 
Prosecution and on the accused.
Even if there is an ambiguity in s 18(2) … this is a criminal provision … as the 
punishments for offences under the Act are harsh and even encompass the death 
penalty, any ambiguity in the statutory language ought to be resolved in favour 
of the accused …
…
22  Ibid. at para. 90.
Under s 18(1), an accused is presumed to have possession of the controlled 
drug if it is proved that he had possession of the keys to a place or premises or 
even a document intended for delivery. Under s 18(2), once this presumption 
of possession is operative, the presumption of knowledge is invoked. Section 
18(2) therefore involves a presumption upon a presumption, a further reversal 
of the burden of proof from the Prosecution to the accused … “the [narrow] 
interpretation” of s 18(2) that the CA in Tan Kiam Peng had considered … to be 
“the more persuasive” one must be the correct one...”23
Although Phuthita Somchit and Tan Kiam Peng are consistent with regard to the existence of 
a real difference between the broad and narrow interpretation and the preference for the narrow 
interpretation, they differ slightly in their reasoning in relation to s. 18(2). The point of divergence 
between the two cases is how s. 18(2) is to be interpreted purposively – the purposive approach, of 
course, being one that is mandated statutorily.24 In this regard, it has been observed that while the 
local cases have used many terminologies to determine what constitutes the purposive approach 
of statutory interpretation, there remains “some conceptual misunderstanding of the true meaning 
of the purposive approach.”25 Three questions that emerge from the conceptual misunderstanding 
are pertinent for present purposes.26 
The first is whether all other approaches in statutory interpretation must yield to the purposive 
approach. There are a number of prominent cases that sit on both sides of the fence. For instance, 
Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng affirmed that the purposive approach takes precedence over all 
other approaches, with the interesting caveat being that the interpretation of the express words must 
remain reasonable.27 Yet, Public Prosecutor v. Manogaran s/o R Ramu held that if the provision 
23  Phuthita Somchit, supra note 4 at paras. 24–25, and 30. 
24  See Interpretation Act (Cap. 1, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing.) s. 9A(1): “In the interpretation of a provision of a 
written law, an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether 
that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation that 
would not promote that purpose or object” [Interpretation Act]. See also Yeo Tiong Min, “Statute and Public 
Policy in Private International Law: Gambling Contracts and Foreign Judgments” (2005) 9 S.Y.B.I.L. 133 at 
139: “The application of this section presupposes two conditions. First, there must be at least two plausible 
interpretations. The purposive approach presupposes that the ‘words are sufficiently flexible to admit of 
some other construction by which [the statutory] intention will be better effectuated.’ Secondly, one of the 
interpretations would promote the purpose or object of the written law, and the other would not.”
25  Goh Yihan, “A Comparative Account of Statutory Interpretation in Singapore” (2008) 29 Stat. L. 
Rev. 195 at 203. See also Goh Yihan, “Statutory Interpretation in Singapore: 15 Years on from Legislative 
Reform” [2009] 21 Sing. Ac. L.J. 97 at para. 11 [Statutory Interpretation in Singapore]. 
26  See generally Statutory Interpretation in Singapore, ibid.
27  [2007] 4 Sing. L.R. (R.) 183 at paras. 41 and 52 [Low Kok Heng]. See also Ho Sheng Yu Garreth v. 
Public Prosecutor, [2012] SGHC 19 at paras. 44 and 55 [Garreth Ho]; Public Prosecutor v. Mohammad 
Ashik bin Aris, [2011] 4 Sing. L.R. 34 at paras. 190–194. Cf. Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995, [1995] 
1 Sing. L.R. (R.) 803 at para. 15, where it was said that the court can modify the legislative words of a 
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is unambiguous, then the court only needs to expound the words in their ordinary and natural 
sense;28 i.e., the literal approach can, in certain circumstances, be placed ahead of and in lieu of the 
purposive approach, contrary to the express words used in the Interpretation Act.29 Closely related 
to this conundrum is the second question of whether the common law strict construction rule of 
penal statutes (as was applied in Tan Kiam Peng and Phuthita Somchit) can only be resorted to in 
limited circumstances – or even at all. Low Kok Heng stated that such a rule can be invoked if a 
provision remains ambiguous after the purposive interpretation has been exhausted.30 Doubt has 
rightly been cast on whether it may be assumed that the purposive approach can be exhausted, 
because this suggests that the legislative intent simply cannot be found in some instances.31 The 
third question is how purpose can be identified: for example, does it refer to the purpose of the 
statute generally, or the provision specifically? Jurisprudence supposedly favours the latter.32 The 
more difficult question may be whether abstract or concrete purposes should be considered.33
The first and second questions can be dealt with in tandem. It can be said with some confidence 
that both Phuthita Somchit and Tan Kiam Peng take the view that the purposive approach does 
not necessarily take precedence over the literal approach and/or the strict construction approach, 
despite the clear language of the Interpretation Act. The primary reasons offered in both cases in 
support of the narrow interpretation were the literal language of s. 18(2), and the possibility of 
the death penalty resulting in the benefit of the doubt being given to the accused (even though 
Phuthita Somchit also placed weight on the presumption upon a presumption). However, it was 
not made clear in either case whether a literal reading of s. 18(2) is conducive to a reasonable/
unreasonable interpretation (since Low Kok Heng suggests that the purposive approach may only 
be resorted to after this is exhausted), lends itself to a plain and clear meaning,34 or how the 
strict construction approach co-exists with the purposive approach. Furthermore, in Tan Kiam 
Peng, the narrow interpretation was preferred despite there being cases that supported the broad 
interpretation and more crucially, despite the narrow interpretation tending to undermine the 
provision to achieve parliamentary object.
28  [1996] 3 Sing. L.R. (R.) 390 at para. 34.
29  Statutory Interpretation in Singapore, supra note 25 at para. 13.
30  Low Kok Heng, supra note 27 at paras. 39–49. See also Garreth Ho, supra note 27 at paras. 55–57.
31  Statutory Interpretation in Singapore, supra note 25 at paras. 8, 18, and 33.
32  Ibid. at paras. 19–20 and 35. See also Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th ed. 
(LexisNexis, 2008) at 947.
33  Statutory Interpretation in Singapore, supra note 25 at para. 36.
34  For instance, there appears to be no significant material at all that aids in the understanding of the 
literal meaning of the very crucial word “nature” in s 18(2). Indeed, as pointed out by the Court of Appeal in 
ADP v. ADQ, [2012] SGCA 6 at para. 29: “If the meaning of the statutory language is plain and clear, then 
the court ought to give effect to that meaning. What the court ought not to do is to superimpose what it feels 
ought to be the meaning of the statutory provision concerned” [emphasis in original]. Although the comments 
in Tan Kiam Peng regarding s. 18 were obiter dicta, the general thrust of those comments resembled the 
aforementioned prohibition against the judicial imposition of the meaning of statutory provisions.
general policy of the MDA (not to mention that the general policy was readily identified by the 
court, which is arguably an additional reason not to prioritise the literal and strict construction 
approaches above the purposive approach).35 It would seem then that in effect, Tan Kiam Peng 
stands for the proposition that the literal approach and strict construction approach can somehow 
be combined to displace the purposive approach – a somewhat  creative and sympathetic approach 
to improve the position of the accused, but possibly in contravention of the purposive approach.36 
Having said that, Phuthita Somchit disputed the relevance of considering whether the MDA was 
undermined or advanced in interpreting s. 18(2) purposively, and this leads to the third question, 
viz., how is purpose identified, and going one step further, what is the consequence of a provision 
being interpreted purposively? 
Should it be said that the greater the desire for the social evil to be eliminated (as evinced in 
parliamentary speeches made by the relevant ministers for example), the more broadly a provision 
should be read in favour of the Prosecution – and hold the converse to be true? If so, what are the 
limits to this, to ensure that the right to the presumption of innocence of the accused is not eroded 
to the point of unacceptability? Or should it first be asked why a specific provision was enacted, 
followed by a consideration of whether the favoured interpretation comports with that reason? 
What about looking at the scheme and purpose of the entire statute and the situating paradigm and 
borderline scenarios within that scheme?37 Fairly recently, Public Prosecutor v. Mohammad Ashik 
bin Aris held that the “underlying rationale of the purposive approach … is to have the courts 
construe statutory provisions, as far as it is reasonably possible to do so, in a manner that enables 
the statutory provision to work effectively having regard to its purpose.”38 However, with regard 
to Tan Kiam Peng, it appears that if the purposive approach leads to a potentially harsh result, it 
can be counterbalanced by the literal and/or strict construction approaches. What then constitutes 
a harsh result? Almost two decades after officially mandating the purposive approach as the 
prioritised canon of statutory interpretation in Singapore, it appears that much remains unclear 
as to how such an approach is actually applied concretely, and s. 18(2) exemplifies this problem.
35  Statutory Interpretation in Singapore, supra note 25 at paras. 1–30.
36  Indeed, is it possible to come up with contrasting versions of what exactly the legislative purpose is? 
On the one hand, it cannot be the case that the Prosecution is allowed to succeed at all costs; on the other 
hand, it probably also cannot be the case that all presumptions of fact against the accused are forbidden 
as a matter of law. There is a balance to be struck, but it does not appear that any of the s. 18 line of cases 
provide assistance in this regard. Paradoxically, while the Court of Appeal in Tan Kiam Peng was prepared 
to displace the purposive approach out of fairness to the accused, it also said that “A purely theoretical 
discourse which tends to abstract itself from the realities and adopts a one-sided approach (which, at bottom, 
favours only the accused) tends to not only implode by its very abstraction but also ignores the fact that, in 
an imperfect and complex world, there is necessarily a whole compendium of rights, all of which must be 
balanced … the Legislature has put in place a structure that balances the rights of accused persons on the one 
hand and the rights of persons in the wider society on the other”: Tan Kiam Peng, supra note 4 at para. 75.
37  Aberrations in the Criminal Law, supra note 2 at 75–83.
38  [2011] 4 Sing. L.R. 34 at para. 191.
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Remaining on the matter of statutory interpretation, perhaps another perspective can be added 
to those already offered thus far as to which interpretation should be the correct one, and it deals 
with interpreting the MDA in conjunction with and in the light of other penal statutes – this must 
surely be necessary, since the MDA does not operate in isolation to the exclusion of other such 
statutes and vice versa. When Tan Ah Tee v. Public Prosecutor (discussed in Tan Kiam Peng)39 
relied on an English case (Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner,40 also discussed in Tan 
Kiam Peng) to establish how the accused could rebut an allegation of drug possession, this was 
criticised because it was thought that a defence in the Penal Code41 should have been applied 
instead.42 Sections 76 and 79, commonly regarded as setting out the defence of mistake, state:43
76 Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason 
of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes 
himself to be, bound by law to do it.
…
79 Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by 
law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of law in good faith 
believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.
Notwithstanding the fact that Tan Kiam Peng has clarified the precise applicability of Warner,44 
the prevailing view is that s. 18 of the MDA effectively precludes an accused from even pleading 
the general exception of mistake:
“[Section] 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act, being narrower in scope, overrides 
s 79 of the Penal Code should the two provisions be inconsistent … a mistake 
between aspirins/heroin or sweets/heroin may not be considered a mistake as to 
“nature” under s 18(2) … and, hence, would not absolve the drug trafficker. If the 
defence of mistake under s 79 of the Penal Code were to apply, it would absolve 
an accused because a mistaken belief that heroin tablets are either aspirins or 
39  [1979–1980] Sing. L.R. (R.) 311 [Tan Ah Tee].
40  [1969] 2 A.C. 256 [Warner].
41  Cap. 224, 2008 Rev. Ed. Sing. [Penal Code].
42  See Koh, Clarkson, and Morgan, Criminal Law in Singapore and Malaysia (Singapore: Malayan Law 
Journal, 1989) at 192 [Criminal Law in Singapore and Malaysia].
43  See also Yeo, Morgan, and Chan, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2007) at 
466 [Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore], which addresses the defence of accident (found in s. 80 of 
the Penal Code): “For example, under s 8(a) of the Singaporean Misuse of Drugs Act, it is an offence to be 
found in possession of a controlled drug. A person who had a drug planted on him or her could rely on the 
s 80 defence to show that he or she had come to have the drug by accident.” 
44  Tan Kiam Peng, supra note 4 at para. 137.
sweets is a mistake of fact. They are different things. However … s 79 of the 
Penal Code is superseded by the express provision relating to mistake as to the 
“nature” of a drug under s 18(2) … generalia specialibus non derogant … should 
apply.”45
Essentially, the argument being made here is that if the points regarding the strict construction 
rule and the presumption upon presumption (in s. 18) are considered legitimate factors in 
ascertaining the correct interpretation, it stands to reason that an accused deprived of an important 
defence tends towards an additional pillar of support for the narrow interpretation.46 Moreover, 
the difficulties that an accused faces, however technical, do not stop here. There is also s. 108 
of the Evidence Act, which states that “When any fact is especially within the knowledge of 
any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”47 There have, of course, been cases 
that clarified that s. 108 does not require the accused to prove the Prosecution’s case – with the 
exception of facts that would be difficult for the Prosecution to prove but easy for the accused to 
prove.48 Whether this has any meaningful impact on s. 18 of the MDA remains untested, although 
one may expect that a court would be unlikely to impose this additional burden on an accused 
facing an MDA charge.
C.      Hong Kong Legislation and Decisions
Finally, it is noteworthy that Hong Kong’s Dangerous Drugs Ordinance49 contains presumptions 
that are rather similar to s. 18 of the MDA.50 These presumptions predate s. 18 of the MDA,51 and 
suspicions that the drafters of the MDA had drawn some inspiration from the DDO would not be 
45  Criminal Law in Singapore and Malaysia, supra note 42 at 192. See also Criminal Law in Malaysia 
and Singapore, supra note 43 at 446. Cf. Aberrations in the Criminal Law, supra note 2 at 58–61.
46  Indeed, taking a step back away from the specifics of s. 18, one of the chief difficulties when interpreting 
the MDA is that key terms are not defined and the precise mens rea is simply not stated. See Chan, Wright, 
and Yeo, Codification, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code (Ashgate, 2011) at 59–60: “[T]here has been 
excessive and confusing reference [in Singapore] to the common law doctrine of mens rea, often at the 
expense of the structure of the [Penal Code] itself … The real problem is that the maxim actus non facit 
reum nisi mens sit rea has been used to interpret the law, especially in the context of new offences outside 
the [Penal Code] where no fault element has been specified. As a result, there has been copious reference to 
common law cases on the question of whether a fault element should be ‘read in’ or whether the offence is 
to be construed as one of ‘strict’ or ‘absolute’ liability...”.
47  Cap. 97, 1997 Rev. Ed. Sing. [Evidence Act].
48  See e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Chee Cheong Hin Constance, [2006] 2 Sing. L.R. (R.) 24 at para. 95. 
49  Cap. 134 (originally Ord. No. 41 of 1968) [DDO].
50  Michael Hor, “Criminal Due Process in Hong Kong and Singapore: A Mutual Challenge” (2007) 37 
Hong Kong L.J. 65 at 69 [Criminal Due Process].
51  See e.g., Hong Kong Legislative Council, Official Report of Proceedings (9 October 1968) 459.
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unreasonable.52 Section 47(1) of the DDO states in a similar manner to s. 18(1) of the MDA that 
“[a]ny person who is proved to have had in his physical possession… anything containing or 
supporting a dangerous drug… shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have had such 
drug in his possession”, and s. 47(2) states in a similar manner to s. 18(2) of the MDA that “[a]ny 
person who is proved or presumed to have had a dangerous drug in his possession shall, until the 
contrary is proved, be presumed to have known the nature of such drug.” 
In R v. Tam Chun Fai,53 R v. Ng Chiu Leung,54 and H.K.S.A.R. v. Chan Ming Fai,55 the Hong 
Kong Court of Appeal indicated that s. 47(1) incorporates a double presumption. Applying that 
provision, a person who has in his physical possession anything containing a dangerous drug, is 
presumed to have legal possession of dangerous drugs and is also presumed to have knowledge of 
the presence of dangerous drugs. As for s. 47(2), it does not create a presumption of knowledge of 
the presence of dangerous drugs as that is covered by the second presumption created by s. 47(1); 
rather, it is meant for use where an accused is shown to have legal possession of a dangerous drug 
but argues that he thought that it was a drug other than what it actually is. In Tam Chun Fai, the 
court further elaborated that having regard to the wording of the offence of drug trafficking in the 
DDO, viz., that it is an offence to traffic in “a” dangerous drug, the exact type of dangerous drug 
that an accused traffics is nothing more than a particular of an offence, and not an ingredient of 
an offence.56 The offence is one of trafficking in a dangerous drug, rather than trafficking in, say, 
salts of esters of morphine specifically. The fact that an accused thought that he was trafficking in 
a dangerous drug different from that which he was charged with would be irrelevant to the issue 
of guilt –  it can, instead, only be relevant in sentencing.57
52  See generally G.L. Peiris, “Some Constitutional, Substantive and Evidentiary Aspects of Drug Control 
Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Law of Singapore, Hong Kong and Canada” (1982) 24 Mal. L. Rev. 
119. Justice V K Rajah’s view seems to be different. In Public Prosecutor v. Tan Kiam Peng, [2007] 1 Sing. 
L.R. (R.) 522, he stated (at para. 15): “It also bears mention that s 18(2) of the MDA appears to have been 
directly inspired by certain observations and musings by Lord Reid and Lord Pearce in Warner.” In Warner, 
Lord Reid had observed (at 280): “In a case like this Parliament, if consulted, might think it right to transfer 
the onus of proof so that an accused would have to prove that he neither knew nor had any reason to suspect 
that he had a prohibited drug in his possession.” Lord Pearce added (at 307): “It would, I think, be an 
improvement of a difficult position if Parliament were to enact that when a person has ownership or physical 
possession of drugs he shall be guilty unless he proves on a balance of probabilities that he was unaware of 
their nature or had reasonable excuse for the possession.”
53  [1994] 2 H.K.C. 397 [Tam Chun Fai] .
54  [1996] 1 H.K.C. 181 [Ng Chiu Leung].
55  [2001] 4 H.K.C. 511 [Chan Ming Fai].
56  Tam Chun Fai, supra note 53 at para. 22. Interestingly, s. 5 of the MDA, which sets out the offence of 
drug trafficking, in similar fashion refers to trafficking in “a” controlled drug.
57  Ibid. at para. 25.
However, Tam Chun Fai, Ng Chiu Leung, and Chan Ming Fai represent an earlier raft of cases 
that have to be reconsidered in light of the Court of Final Appeal’s 2006 decision in H.K.S.A.R. 
v. Hung Chan Wa.58 In the main judgment by Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, it was held that s. 47(1) 
has to be understood in light of the common law conceptualisation of possession.59 Lord Pearce’s 
dicta in Warner that “the term ‘possession’ is satisfied by a knowledge only of the existence of the 
thing itself and not its qualities, and that ignorance or mistake as to its qualities is not an excuse” 
was cited.60 Based on the common law conceptualisation of possession, it would be unnecessary 
for the implied presumption of knowledge in s. 47(1) “to extend to knowledge of the nature of the 
drug or knowledge that it was a dangerous drug, in order to constitute legal possession at common 
law.”61 Absent legislative intention to the contrary, there “is no reason at all why the presumption 
as to knowledge of the presence of the thing itself should be extended to knowledge of its nature 
or qualities.”62 The presumption as to knowledge of nature or qualities of a dangerous drug would, 
instead, be covered by s. 47(2), the interpretation of which was analysed as follows:63 
“[T]he presumption under s.47(2) of knowledge of the presence of a dangerous 
drug in a container is relevantly linked to the possession-based offences created 
by ss 4 and 8 of the Ordinance.
The explanation of the relationship between s.47(1) and (2) and the seemingly 
infelicitous language of sub-section (2) is to be found, as the Court of Appeal 
held, in attributing to it the purpose of responding to the expectation that the 
courts would, in accordance with established principle, read into the offence 
provisions, a requirement of knowledge of the presence of a dangerous drug…  
The case for adopting this approach is a very strong one.  The offences created 
by ss 4 and 8 are serious offences; the former (trafficking) very serious, being 
punishable with a sentence of life imprisonment.
So understood, s.47(2) sheds most of the difficulties which have been thought to 
surround it. It is directed at an additional element of the offences which stands 
outside the common law concept of legal possession dealt with by s.47(1). In the 
58  [2006] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 841 [Hung Chan Wa].
59  Ibid. at para. 65.
60  Warner, supra note 40 at 305.
61  Hung Chan Wa, supra note 58 at para. 67.
62  Ibid.
63  Ibid. at paras. 69–71.
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expectation that the two presumptions carrying the prosecution case based on 
physical possession forward to legal possession will not be enough to establish the 
mental element – knowledge of the nature of the drug – on which the courts would 
insist, a further presumption is provided by s.47(2). Once this is acknowledged, the 
relationship between s.47(1) and (2) is comprehensible and the opening words of 
sub-section (2) serve the purpose of indicating that, after proof or presumption of 
legal possession, there is introduced another presumption, namely of knowledge 
of the nature of the drug.  The explanation provides an important role for s.47(2) 
…”
Although the foregoing would appear to indicate that the Hong Kong cases cannot shed much 
direct light on the question of whether the narrow or broad interpretation should apply, the latter 
part of the main judgment in Hung Chan Wa, nevertheless, is interesting as it raises a possible 
approach to ameliorating any severity of the law arising out of s. 18(2) – this being to read the 
presumptions in  s. 18 as imposing mere evidential burdens (as opposed to legal burdens) on the 
accused.64 This was the course adopted by the court in Hung Chan Wa vis-à-vis s. 47 of the DDO, 
after it had regard to the presumption of innocence provision – which incidentally, is expressed in 
rather robust terms – in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.65 However, insofar as the right 
to presumption of innocence is not expressed in similar fashion in Singapore’s Constitution66 and 
also the Evidence Act for that matter (indeed the Evidence Act may even be said to qualify the 
right), this forms a significant and fundamental impediment to Singapore’s courts following Hung 
Chan Wa.67 Moreover, insofar as the Privy Council decision of Jayasena v. R.68 remains good 
law in Singapore – in that case, it was decided that all references to burdens in the Evidence Act 
pertain to legal, as opposed to evidential burdens – this forms another fundamental impediment 
to adopting the latest Hong Kong approach, if one assumes and extrapolates that any reference to 
burdens in the MDA is to legal, rather than evidential, burdens.  
64  See also Jeffrey Pinsler, SC, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 2010) at 402–05.
65  Cap. 383 (originally Ord. No. 59 of 1991). See also Criminal Due Process, supra note 50 at 69–71.
66  1999 Rev. Ed. Sing. [Constitution].
67  For a discussion on how the Constitution and Evidence Act actually erode the right to presumption of 
innocence in Singapore, see Michael Hor, “The Presumption of Innocence – A Constitutional Discourse for 
Singapore” [1995] Sing. J.L.S. 365. See also Albert Buchman, “The Misapplication of Leung Kwok Hung 
in Hong Kong: Authorising the Rationality Requirement for Textually Absolute Rights” (2010) 19 Pac. Rim 
L. & Pol’y J. 565.
68  [1970] A.C. 618. See also PP v. Yuvaraj, [1969] 2 M.L.J. 89.
iii.      ConCluSion
It is intriguing how a simple set of words in s. 18 of the MDA can generate so much jurisprudential 
and academic thought.69 As this piece has attempted to demonstrate, there are various intertwined 
issues in s. 18 which arise just from a consideration of whether the narrow or broad interpretation 
is correct. Given the severe penalties at stake, they ought to be examined more thoroughly. 
Ideally, for a statute as important as the MDA (in terms of the possible harsh penalties), legislative 
amendment is the most effective way to inject clarity, but expecting that may be hoping for too 
much. It is thus incumbent on our courts to ensure that the legal reasoning underlying its provisions 
is as robust and exhaustive as possible.
69  See also Koh T.T.B., “Drug Abuse and Community Response in Singapore” (1974) 2 Intl. J. Crim. & 
Pen. 51.
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